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Why don’t prediction-error minimizers
waste away in maximally predictable—
but maximally boring—environments?
Van de Cruys, Friston, and Clark [1] offer
an elegant and even poetic answer: a
bias toward ‘optimism’.
The idea, echoed by Seth et al. [2] and a
broader literature, is that agents tend to
predict favorable outcomes: full bellies,
stable blood-glucose levels, adequate hy-
dration, and so on. When those predictions
aren’t met, prediction-error accumulates,
which can be reduced by acting to make
the predictions come true (so-called ‘active
inference’). For example, if you optimisti-
cally predict that you won’t be hungry, but
then you find yourself not having eaten
in a while, you can reduce the ensuing
prediction-error by taking matters into
your own hands and eating. Optimistic pre-
dictions thus act like self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, leading us toward flourishing states:
after enough time in a dark, empty room,
these predictions become falser and falser
until there is no choice but to leave and
fulfill them.
Does this response succeed? We’re
initially tempted to play some thought-
experiment tennis and simply modify the
original scenario. Instead of an empty
room, we could add an IV drip with just
the right electrolyte balance, a thermostat
to tailor the temperature, and so on for
other bodily functions. (Call it the ‘Homeo-
static Room’.) Since ‘our expected states
are determined by what it takes to
maintain homeostasis’ [3], this arrange-
ment should be paradise for a surprise-
minimizer. Yet, it seems unlikely that
you'd stay.But perhaps optimism extends even further
than homeostatic states. If agents are opti-
mistic not only about their blood-glucose
and hydration levels but also which friends
they will see, which hikes they will take,
and more, then surprise-minimizers might
leave even the Homeostatic Room and be-
come well-adjusted members of society.
A deeper problem is lurking here. Predic-
tive Processing (PP) considers beliefs and
desires to be ‘an elusive and degenerate
duality’ [1], and so aims to replace them
with a single state: prediction. But appeal-
ing to optimism works against this aim,
because what counts as 'optimistic'
depends on one’s desires. To be optimis-
tic is, roughly, to predict that what you
want to happen is what will actually
happen—to believe that events will unfold
in the way you desire. Bountiful feasts
and beautiful hikes only get to be optimis-
tic predictions because the relevent
agents find those outcomes desirable.
That’s why optimism looks different for dif-
ferent people: an optimistic ascetic might
predict a day of solitary meditation rather
than a feast with friends; different out-
comes count as optimistic for her, be-
cause she has different underlying
desires. But no desires beyond ‘minimize
surprise’ are permitted in PP’s psychol-
ogy; that, we thought, was the (central
and radical) point. In that case, the only
way optimism gets agents out of Dark
Rooms and living their lives is by smuggling
in desires after all; indeed, all the same de-
sires we already knew the agents to have.
(Nor will it do to define optimism relative to
evolutionary considerations. We are not
prisoners of our evolutionary drives, as the
ascetic’s case shows.) What work, then,
has PP done?
PP as a ‘theory of everything’ is exciting be-
cause of the simplicity, power, and reach it
advertises. It promises not only a tool to
model some aspects of reward learning or
visual processing [4], but also a worldview
to ‘radically reconceptualize who we are’Tr[5]—‘a single principle by which neural oper-
ations can account for perception, cogni-
tion, action, and even consciousness’ [6]. If
this single principle requires an optimistic
bias for any behavior that is not transparently
surprise-minimizing, it stands to lose this
special appeal. The behaviorism analogy
continues to be apt: when an initially elegant
view—reinforcement all the way down—
needs a supplementary list of self-
reinforcers for every otherwise-unexplained
behavior, it risks becoming false (are all
those biases really in there?) or trivially true
(Box 1).
Still, we acknowledge that this feeling is
not universal; indeed, the replies raise
similar objections against belief-desire
psychology. But self-fulfilling predictions
present additional difficulties.
The ‘Pessimistic Prediction’
Problem
We often make predictions that we
hope won’t come true. Suppose you are
headed for a night on the town and, know-
ing yourself, you predict you will drink too
much. Given this pessimism, you may try
to prevent this prediction from being
realized—e.g., by asking friends to monitor
you, by bringing less cash, etc. A traditional
account of such behaviors would invoke be-
liefs and desires: you believe you will over-
drink, but you desire not to.
What about PP? Recall how prediction-
error minimization and active inference
jointly transform our predictions into self-
fulfilling prophecies: your prediction that
you will eat compels you to eat, because
your failure to eat increases prediction-
error that you must then act to minimize.
While this mechanism works virtuously
for optimistic predictions, it seems to invite
disaster for pessimistic ones: the same
mechanism should trigger a vicious feed-
back loop, whereby your overdrinking-
prediction fulfills itself by making you
drink all the more. Worse yet, your friends,
anticipating your overdrinking, should nowends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 1
Box 1. Is Predictive Processing Falsifiable?
Is the Predictive Processing (PP)/Free Energy Principle (FEP) view falsifiable? A common response is that the very
question rests on a kind of conceptual mistake: ‘FEP is a framework, not a testable hypothesis’ [2]; “the notion
that a ‘framework’ can have the attribute ‘falsifiable’ is a category error… falsifiable hypotheses are a hangover
from classical inference” [7].
This strikes us as a little too clever. That PP/FEP is a framework, rather than a testable hypothesis, may well be
true; but this does little to defuse broader concerns about its reach. One could simply reframe the question: for
which mental phenomena is PP/FEP a useful and explanatory framework? Recall how all-encompassing the
framework is meant to be: ‘The free energy principle is extremely ambitious: it aims to explain everything about
the mind’ [3]. But as Seth et al. [2] and Clark [8] concede, much of what underlies human flourishing—art, ad-
venture, charity, and more—strains the framework and its principles.
The analogy to behaviorism is helpful yet again. Reinforcement, too, is not a 'hypothesis' that can be 'falsified'.
What can be falsified is the thesis that all of who andwhat we are is captured by that notion. So too for PP/FEP,
hangovers aside.
What is the Motivation for PP?
We are nowhere near the first to discuss the Dark Room Problem, nor are we the first to worry that PP may be
unfalsifiable [9]. Indeed, there are recent and powerful arguments that the most ambitious flavors of PP are not
only falsifiable, but also false as theories of our own minds and brains [10,11]. It is notable, then, that despite
claims by both replies that PP is ‘testable’ [1,2], they give no indication of what should strengthen or weaken
our confidence in it. What should make us accept or reject PP?
The story of behaviorism again offers a guide. For all of behaviorism’s troubles, Skinner had principled reasons for
explaining behavior in terms of reinforcement: He believed that notions of internal mental states were unscientific,
and feared ‘the specter of teleology’ raised by talk of intentions. Though the cognitive revolution showed how
mental states can cause behaviors through the mechanisms of computation, we can still look back and appreci-
ate that behaviorismwasmotivated (at least, until an alternative came along). If PP/FEP is merely a framework that
redescribes psychological phenomena in predictive terms—rather than a falsifiable theory—then what is the mo-
tivation for embracing it? There are, in principle, many unfalsifiable ways to redescribe our minds; why this one?
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encouraging you more than if you hadn’t
warned them. But this just isn’t what hap-
pens: clinical self-sabotage notwith-
standing, it is perfectly possible to
make a prediction and then try to
become wrong about it. More gener-
ally, pessimism rarely motivates self-
fulfillment: anticipating a stock-market
crash does not motivate you to bring
the crash about; believing your favored
politician will lose does not make you
canvas for her opponent, etc.
Perhaps PP could reply by suggesting that
you don’t know your own predictions,
even when they are made explicitly: you
may think you predict the worst, but really
you don’t. Or maybe your prediction is dis-
junctive, even if it may not feel that way: “I’ll
overdrink, or I’ll prevent it like so”. But
such replies introduce new costs of their
own—such as an implausibly extreme2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xxself-ignorance, or a difficulty constraining
and selecting among disjuncts—or they
may not actually accommodate the
full spectrum of cases (e.g., the stock
market and election cases above, and
pessimistic inaction more generally).
What worked for optimism, then, seems
to fail for pessimism.
Poetry, Rollercoasters, and
Bucket-Lists
Optimistic predictions are not the only pro-
posed solution to the Dark Room Prob-
lem. Seth et al. [2] offer another: leaving
the room does increase prediction-error,
but only over the short-term, because
more surprise now enables better predic-
tions later.
Our piece discussed this response: if Dark
Roomsare only localminimawithin a broader
predictive landscape, then prediction-error
minimization can indeed recommend leaving,evenwithout optimistic biases. Still, this reply,
like PP itself, leaves such an approachworry-
ingly underconstrained. Over what timeframe
do minds like ours minimize expected free
energy? (A day? A lifetime? The arc of our
species?) Seth et al. don’t say, invoking
only ‘long temporal horizons’, ‘extended
sequences’, and ‘the future’—vague and
flexible notions that could bend to accom-
modate nearly any result.
More importantly, leaving the room is only a
first step. Humans are, or appear to be,
motivated by so much more than error-
minimization:weplaymusic, help strangers,
read poetry, have children, build churches,
climb mountains, and smell flowers. We
do so even when these experiences are
overly familiar and so of little predictive
benefit (e.g., replaying a favorite song, or
rereading a cherished poem). And we
do so even when they are unlikely to fur-
ther any long-term predictive agenda
(e.g., the terminally ill patient who finally
takes that exciting bucket-list trip). Can
it really be that these activities, so essen-
tial to human flourishing, arise for their
long-term predictive utility?
Seth et al. sometimes seem to admit not:
‘will this approach explain rollercoaster-
riding and poetry-reading? In the details,
perhaps not’. But they elsewhere dismiss
such behaviors as ‘rare’, instead empha-
sizing how PP explains ‘epistemic actions
such as eye movements’, or even ‘an
agent’s beliefs about the world’ (a
reference to their model of E. coli
chemotaxis). We worry that this has things
backwards. Saccadic planning and flagel-
lar control are surely important processes;
indeed, we study (one of) them too [12].
But they are just not the critical phenom-
ena under discussion. Here we are
moved by Clark, who elsewhere acknowl-
edges that humans’ drive for self-
actualization presents ‘the most genu-
inely challenging incarnation of the Dark-
ened Room worry’ [8]. That seems
exactly right. Personal growth, aesthetic
Trends in Cognitive Sciencesexperience, moral worth, and somuch else
about us are not rare or peculiar distrac-
tions—they anchor the full and meaningful
lives we seek. Perhaps, then, one’s feelings
about PP as a 'theory of everything' will
turn on one’s feelings about humanity itself.
This would be a credit to PP: any theory
that motivates such deep and enduring
questions is one worth our attention.
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